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A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxe
Abstract: We extend the linear reforms introduced by Pfa¨hler (1984) to the case of dual
taxes. We study the relative effect that linear dual tax cuts have on the inequality of income
distribution -a symmetrical study can be made for dual linear tax hikes-. We also introduce
measures of the degree of progressivity for dual taxes and show that they can be connected
to the Lorenz dominance criterion. Additionally, we study the tax liability elasticity of each
of the reforms proposed. Finally, by means of a microsimulation model and a considerably
large data set of taxpayers drawn from 2004 Spanish Income Tax Return population, 1) we
compare different yield-equivalent tax cuts applied to the Spanish dual income tax and 2) we
investigate how much income redistribution the dual tax reform (Act ‘35/2006’) introduced
with respect to the previous tax.
Keywords: Dual taxes, linear reforms, Lorenz domination, lattices
JEL: E60, E62
Resum: En aquest treball extenem les reformes lineals introdu¨ıdes per Pfa¨hler (1984) al
cas d’impostos duals. Estudiem l’efecte relatiu que els retalls lineals duals d’un impost dual
tenen sobre la distribucio´ de la desigualtat -es pot fer un estudi sime`tric per al cas d’augments
d’impostos-. Tambe introdu¨ım mesures del grau de progressivitat d’impostos duals i mostrem
que estan connectades amb el criteri de dominaci de Lorenz. Addicionalment, estudiem
l’elasticitat de la ca`rrega fiscal de cadascuna de les reformes proposades. Finalment, gra`cies
a un model de microsimulacio´ i una gran base de dades que conte´ informacio´ sobre l’IRPF
espanyol de l’any 2004, 1) comparem l’efecte que diferents reformes tindrien sobre l’impost
dual espanyol i 2) estudiem quina redistribucio´ de la riquesa va suposar la reforma dual de
l’IRPF (Llei ’35/2006’) respecte l’anterior impost.
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isterio de Educacio´n y Ciencia of the Spanish Government, from the Barcelona Economics
Program of CREA, Ministerio de Educacio´n y Ciencia and FEDER, under grant ECO2008-
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, there have been trends to reform tax systems in OECD countries. One
of the implicit goals of tax reforms has been the reduction of the individual tax burden as
a policy measure to boost economy and to promote incentives. In this context, Personal
Income Tax reforms have had a prominent role in the political agenda.
In the case of the Spanish Income Tax, three reforms have been applied since 1998. The
latest one introduced the Dual Income Tax (Act 35/2006). Tax cuts have been embedded
within more general policy measures related to the efficiency and equity aspects of the tax. In
particular, progressivity and redistributive consequences of such reforms have been relevant
policy issues to be considered. The evaluation of the impact of such reforms on income
distribution and individual welfare is basically a matter of empirical assessment.
If policy makers’ primary concern is to reduce (or increase) tax liability so that charac-
teristics of the tax such as progressivity, redistribution, elasticity are preserved after reform,
Pfa¨hler’s analysis of linear tax reforms applied to a unidimensional tax would be very useful
for its simplicity and normative results1.
Pfa¨hler (1984) considers neutral-revenue tax reforms that reduce (or increa-
se) tax liability. According to his results, tax cuts maintaining residual progression un-
changed are the most redistributive reforms. Additionally, whenever the income distribution
is positively skewed and the tax function is progressive such cuts are also the most welfare-
improving reforms. Furthermore, this option would be chosen in a majority vote process for
income distributions with more ’poor’ than ’rich’ tax-payers, in a way that will be shown
later. For tax increases, initial tax liability progression should be the relevant measure to be
considered.
Pfa¨hler’s analysis deals with the case of only one tax function (in fact, he uses Income
Tax as a case in his study). The following question is consequently of interest. Are the above
1A tax reform is named ’linear’ if the post-reform average tax rate is obtained as a linear transformation
of the initial average tax rate.
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results still valid for dual taxes, or more generally, for tax cuts (or increases) which are shared
by two or more different taxes?
In this paper, we extend the analysis of linear tax reforms to the dual tax case, both
theoretically and empirically. Specifically, we analyze if normative assessments derived from
Pfa¨hler are accomplished in the case of dual taxes.
To do this, dual progression measures are defined for dual taxes and their relationship to
Lorenz dominance is discussed. Regarding Lorenz dominance criterion, it is proved that a
partial order among linear dual tax reforms can be established if certain condition -that will
be stated later- on income distributions is fulfilled, provided also that tax cuts are neutral-
revenue in the two different income bases. This result can be considered a benchmark to
guide reforms.
In the empirical part of the paper, we use a micro-simulation model to illustrate the
differential incidence analysis of linear tax reforms which comes from the theoretical results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes linear tax reforms in the
case of dual taxes. Progressivity measures applied to dual tax schedules are discussed. Section
3 analyzes the effect of linear tax reforms on income inequality. Reforms are also compared in
terms of Lorenz dominance. Section 4 is dedicated to the analysis of tax elasticity. Section 5
analyzes the effects of different tax cuts applied to a dual tax by means of a micro-simulation
model which uses a large sample of Spanish income tax returns from 2005. We also study
the effect of the Spanish Personal Income Tax (Act ‘35/2006’) on the income redistribution
regarding the tax before reform. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Dual taxes, tax cuts and progressivity measures
The current structure of the Spanish Personal Income Tax is a dual one. There are two
different tax schedules applied separately onto two different income bases, henceforth called
labor and capital income bases. Regarding the analysis of tax reforms, there are two matters
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of significance: 1) the effect on the income inequality and 2) the degree of progressivity of
the post-reform tax. Pfa¨hler studied these issues in the context of three types of linear tax
reforms for unidimensional taxes. We shall substantiate Pfa¨hler’s work in the context of dual
taxes. This extension could be useful in other scenarios, for instance, the one in which a
government intends to carry out a reform on (unidimensional) personal income tax and on
value-added tax simultaneously.
Pfa¨hler assumed that a tax function consisted only of a tax schedule which, applied to
the pre-tax income, provided the post-tax income. Given any progressive tax schedule, he
proposed three different (unidimensional) tax reforms to be defined respectively either as
fraction a of the tax liability T (x), as a fraction b of the post-tax income V (x) = x − T (x)
or as a fraction c of the pre-tax income x. Each one of these reforms is neutral with respect
to local measure of tax progressivity: liability progression, residual progression and average
rate progression (see Musgrave and Thin, 1948). If t(x) = T (x)/x is the average tax rate of
the current tax schedule T (x), let T1(x), T2(x) and T3(x) be the three reforms:
T1(x) = T (x)− aT (x) ⇐⇒ t1(x) = (1− a)t(x)
T2(x) = T (x)− bV (x) ⇐⇒ t2(x) = (1 + b)t(x)− b
T3(x) = T (x)− cz ⇐⇒ t3(x) = t(x)− c.
Generally, the derivative of the tax schedule is a sum of step functions defined by marginal
tax rates and by income thresholds. In this particular case, it is easy to prove that applying
the above linear cuts on the whole tax schedule is equivalent to transforming the marginal
tax rates according to the linear function that defines the tax cut2. The three above trans-
formations of the original tax are neutral-revenue if and only if b = ag/ (1− g) and c = ag,
where g = T
z
is the quotient between the average tax liability T and the average pre-tax
income z. Observe that g is the proportion of the tax burden in terms of pre-tax incomes,
whereas g/ (1− g) = T/V is the proportion of the tax burden in terms of post-tax incomes.
Hence, if we assume the yield-equivalent condition holds, there is only one design parameter,
2See Remark 1 in the Appendix
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let us say a, whereas g is an ex-ante parameter and c and b are obtained multiplying a by g
and g/ (1− g) respectively.
A tax function maps tax-payers’ pre-tax income to net post-tax income. In the case of the
Spanish PIT, the tax function is organized as follows. First of all, the pre-tax income of each
tax-payer is divided into labor and capital pre-tax income respectively. Then, three similar
sequential steps are applied separately to both labor and capital incomes. In the first one,
using tax-payer’s monetary and non-monetary information, allowances are deducted from
gross income to obtain the taxable labor and the taxable capital incomes respectively. In the
second step, using only tax-payer’s monetary information, two different tax rate schedules
are applied to each of the taxable incomes to obtain the gross tax liability. The difference
between the taxable income and the gross tax burden is called gross post-tax income. Finally,
the net post-tax income is obtained from the gross post-tax income after applying a series of
tax credits.
Because of the difficulty of introducing non-monetary information into an analytical model
in the theoretical part of this paper and for the sake of simplicity, we do not consider the
role of allowances and tax credits on the tax. This approach is the same that Pfa¨hler
(1984) implicitly followed. When it comes to real tax functions, allowances can be roughly
approximated by linear transformations of the pre-tax income (see for instance Fries et al,
1982). If we assume that allowances and tax credits steps are essentially a homothety, then
taxable incomes can be seen as re-scaled pre-tax incomes, whereas net post-tax incomes can
be seen as re-scaled gross post-tax incomes and none of our theoretical results has to be
abandoned when we consider the real input and output of the tax function. Simulation
results in Section 5 are obtained according to our theoretical predictions.
In what follows let x ≥ 0 be taxable labor income before tax and y ≥ 0 taxable capital
income before tax. Then, a dual tax schedule is defined by
(1) T (x, y) = L(x) +K(y) ≤ x+ y
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where L(·),K(·) are unidimensional tax schedules. When both L(·),K(·) are progressive3, we
say that T (x, y) is quasi-progressive.
Consider a (finite) set of tax-payers with pre-tax labor incomes and pre-tax capital incomes
given by distributions x˜ = (x1, ..., xn) and y˜ = (y1, ..., yn) respectively, where (xk, yk) are the
incomes of the tax-payer k. Then, let x be the average pre-tax labor income, y the average
pre-tax capital income, L be the average labor liability and K the average capital liability.
We also introduce the following initial rates, gL =
L
x
and gK =
K
y
.
We represent the dual tax schedule obtained from a dual tax schedule T (x, y) applying a
reform of type i on the labor tax schedule and a reform of type j on the capital tax schedule
by
(2) Ti,j(x, y) =
Li(x)︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρLi L(x) + σ
L
i x+
Kj(y)︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρKj K(y) + σ
K
j y,
for i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3. As an example, in the case T1,2 the parameters are ρ
L
1 = 1−aL,
σLi = 0, ρ
K
1 = 1 + bK and σ
K
i = −bK . By means of simple algebra, it is proven that the
positive (resp. negative) change ∆Ri,j on the aggregate total
4 post-tax income when a tax
cut (resp. a tax increase) of type Ti,j(x, y) is applied to T (x, y) is given by
(3) ∆Ri,j =
((
1− ρLi
)
L− σLi x+
(
1− ρKj
)
K − σKj y
)
· n.
Dividing equation (3) by (x+ y) · n, the yield-equivalent condition for the above tax cuts
is
(4) ∆R = δ ·


∆Li︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− ρLi
)
gL − σ
L
i

+ (1− δ) ·


∆Kj︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− ρKj
)
gK − σ
K
j


where δ = x/ (x+ y) and the relative change ∆R on the aggregate total tax liability with
respect to the aggregate total pre-tax income does not depend either on i or on j. The above
expression generalizes the yield-equivalent condition introduced by Pfa¨hler to the dual tax
case.
3That is, d
dx
(L(x)
x
) ≥ 0, d
dy
(K(y)
y
) ≥ 0.
4We use total to refer to both labor and capital.
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An example of the usefulness of the above expression is provided next. When carrying
out a tax reform, the policymaker usually decides which extra aggregate amount of money
the tax-payers can keep (or the Govern-
ment not get), in comparison to the current tax. For instance, the policyma-
ker wants to carry out a cut T1,2 that supposes that each tax-payer keeps on average 10%
more of the pre-tax income compared to the pre-reform tax, i.e. ∆R = 0.1. Notice that
gL and gK depend only on the current dual tax, whereas the proportion of the average pre-
tax labor income with respect to the pre-tax average income, δ, depend only on the income
distribution, i.e. neither gL, gK nor δ depend on the reforms. For instance, gL = 0.3, gK = 0.2
and δ = 0.8. In such case, (4) results on 24·aL+16·bK = 10. That is, there is only one degree
of freedom: either aL or bK . If for some reason bK has to be equal to 0.05, then aL = 0.383.
Observe that a particular and more restrictive case is obtained where ∆Li and ∆Kj
are both equal across reforms. In such case, (4) reduces to the yield-equivalent condition
introduced by Pfa¨hler, separately applied on the labor and on the capital parts of the dual
tax.
Regarding the measuring of the degree of progressivity of a dual tax, the first approach
is to consider a unidimensional measure. Given a dual tax schedule T (x, y), we could 1)
apply the definition of liability progression directly to T (x, y) seen as a unidimensional tax
on the total income x+ y and 2) consider a weighted mean of αL(x) and αK(y), the liability
progressions associated to labor and capital tax schedules respectively.
However, the two above approaches are not without their flaws. The first option is not
valid as T (x, y) need not be a function on x + y. Indeed, it is not difficult to find two tax
schedules L(x) and K(y) and two pairs of incomes (x, y) y (x′, y′) such as x + y = x′ + y′
and T (x, y) 6= T (x′, y′). On the other hand, in the second option a more progressive labor
tax could be shadowed by a regressive -or less progressive- capital tax. The drawbacks of
both unidimensional approximations are the same as those arising when we try to extend the
complete order structure of R to R2.
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On the basis of what have been stated, the next step would be to establish bidimensional
definitions of the progressivity of dual taxes5. Such definitions should be used to compare,
whenever possible, the degree of progressivity of any pair of dual tax schedules.
Next we define the labor post-tax income VL(x) = x−L(x) ≥ 0, the capital post-tax income
VK(y) = y−K(y) ≥ 0, the total post-tax income V (x, y) = x+y−T (x, y) = VL(x)+VK(y) ≥ 0,
the average labor type tL(x) =
L(x)
x
, the average capital type tK(y) =
K(y)
y
and the average
total type t(x, y) = T (x,y)
x+y . Let also > be the ordinary partial order on R
2: (x1, y1) > (x2, y2)
if x1 > x2 and y1 > y2. Then, the following three measures are proposed:
• Dual Liability Progression: the elasticities of labor liability and capital liability
with respect to the pre-tax labor income and the pre-tax capital income respectively
are defined as
(5) −→αT (x, y) = (α
L(x), αK(y)) =
(
dL(x)
dx
x
L(x)
,
dK(y)
dy
y
K(y)
)
.
• Dual Residual Progression: the elasticities of both the post-tax labor income and
the post-tax capital income with respect to the pre-tax labor income and the pre-tax
capital income respectively are defined as
(6)
−→
ψT (x, y) = (ψ
L(x), ψK(y)) =
(
dVL(x)
dx
x
VL(x)
,
dVK(y)
dy
y
VK(y)
)
.
• Dual Average Rate Progression: the changes of both the labor average type and
the capital average type with respect to the pre-tax labor income and the pre-tax capital
income respectively are defined as
(7)
−→
βT (x, y) = (β
L(x), βK(y)) =

dL(x)x
dx
,
dK(y)
y
dy

 .
It is important to point out that the definition of Liability Progression for a unidimensional
tax schedule T (z) was introduced by Musgrave and Thin (1948) as the limit of the elasticity
5For a further justification see Example 1 in the Appendix.
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of the tax liability with respect to pre-tax incomes x0 < x1
(8) αT (x0, x1) =
T (x1)− T (x0)
T (x0)
·
x0
x1 − x0
,
when x1 approximates x0. We introduce this definition because discrete definitions will be
needed for some proofs (see Proposition 4 in the Appendix).
Finally, the larger αT (x) is, the more progressive T (x) is in x according to the liability
progression criterion. Therefore, we say that T (x, y) is more progressive than T̂ (x, y) accord-
ing to the dual liability progression criterion if −→αT (x, y) ≥
−→α
T̂
(x, y) for all (x, y). Analogous
comments can be made about the other two dual measures.
3 Linear reforms and their effect on the inequality of the post-
tax income distribution
This section is devoted to the study of the relative effect that each of the reforms proposed has
on the inequality of the post-tax income distribution. This effect can be studied 1) globally,
i.e. understanding what happens to the whole post-tax income distribution for the different
cuts proposed, according to some global criteria and 2) locally, i.e. comparing relative net
gain (or loss) across reforms for each tax-payer.
3.1 Global effects
First we focus on the global effects of linear dual tax reforms. We specifically prove that,
provided some constraints to be introduced below hold, Pfa¨hler-based cuts Ti,j can be com-
pared according to the (restrictive) criterion of Lorenz domination6. A symmetrical study
6Given an income distribution x˜ = (x1 ≤ ... ≤ xn), the Lorenz curve Lx˜ is defined by the following ordered
pairs
(
p
n
, Lx˜(p)
)
, for p = 1, ..., n, where
Lx˜(p) =
∑p
i=1 xi∑n
i=1 xi
.
Then, given two income distributions x˜ = (x1 ≤ ... ≤ xn) and y˜ = (y1 ≤ ... ≤ yn), we say that x˜ is Lorenz
dominated (LD) by y˜ if and only if Lx˜(p) ≤ Ly˜(p), for p = 1, ..., n.
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can be carried out for tax hikes.
Taking into account the hypothesis of neutral revenue, Pfa¨hler proved that his three unidi-
mensional tax cuts can be compared using the LD criterion on post-tax income distributions.
According to his results, T2 is the most redistributive reform whereas T1 is the least. On the
other hand, Jakobbson (1976) showed that it is the same to compare the residual progression
between two different tax schedules and compared, under the Lorenz Dominance, the post-
tax income distributions obtained applying the two different tax schedules to an arbitrary
distribution7.
Next we prove that the two above results can be extended to include dual taxes if the two
following conditions hold,
• (Condition 1) The aggregate labor tax liability and the aggregate capital tax liability
are equal across reforms.
• (Condition 2) The relative order of incomes of both labor and capital income distri-
butions coincides.
Observe that Condition 1 applies to the dual tax cuts and tells us that they must be simul-
taneously labor yield-equivalent and capital yield-equivalent. On the other hand, Condition
2 is applied to income distributions. This last condition does not hold if we consider real sets
of tax-payers. However, it enables us to obtain benchmark results. Moreover, this condition
makes more sense if we consider groups of tax-payers instead of single tax-payers. In Section
5 we show that assuming Condition 2 is feasible in light of real income distributions.
Given a dual tax T (x, y) and labor and capital income distributions x˜ and y˜ we denote
by V2(x˜, y˜) = {xi + yi − T (xi, yi)}
n
i=1 the post-tax income distribution and by T2(x˜, y˜) =
{T2(xi, yi)}
n
i=1 the tax liability distribution. The connection between the Lorenz dominance
7In the Appendix the results needed from both Jakobbson (1976) and Pfa¨hler (1984) are rewritten in the
adequate way to be used in this paper.
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criterion and the dual progressivity measures proposed in this paper is shown in the next
Theorem.
Theorem 1 Given a (finite) set of tax-payers with labor incomes x˜ = (x1 ≤ ... ≤ xn) and
capital incomes y˜ = (y1 ≤ ... ≤ yn) and two arbitrary quasi-progressive dual tax schedules
T1(·, ·) and T2(·, ·) that are labor and capital yield-equivalent, then
1.
−→
ψ1(x, y) <
−→
ψ2(x, y) for all (x, y) implies that V2(x˜, y˜) is LD by V1(x˜, y˜). However, the
reciprocal does not hold.
2. −→α1(x, y) >
−→α2(x, y) for all (x, y) implies that T1(x˜, y˜) is LD by T2(x˜, y˜). However, the
reciprocal does not hold.
Proof.
1. By definition, if
−→
ψ1(x, y) <
−→
ψ2(x, y) for all (x, y) we have that for all x
(9) ψL1 (x) < ψ
L
2 (x)
and for all y
(10) ψK1 (y) < ψ
K
2 (y).
From Proposition 1 in Jakobbson (1976) -see Proposition 4 in the Appendix-, we have
that (9) and (10) are equivalent to V L2 (x˜) = {xi − L2(xi)}
n
i=1 LD by V
L
1 (x˜) = {xi −
L1(xi)}
n
i=1 and V
K
2 (y˜) = {yi − K2(yi)}
n
i=1 LD by V
K
1 (y˜) = {yi − K2(yi)}
n
i=1. On the
other hand, from hypothesis8 and Lemma 4 in the Appendix we have that V2(x˜, y˜) =
{xn − L2(xn) + yn −K2(yn)}
n
i=1 is LD by V1(x˜, y˜) = {xi − L1(xn) + yi −K1(yi)}
n
i=1.
8It is important to take into account that both L(x) and K(y) as well as both Li(x) y Kj(y) for all
i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3 are non-decreasing functions and therefore do not alter the relative order of the
income distributions. The same can be said about both V L(x) and V K(y) as well as V Li (x) and V
K
j (y) for all
i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3.
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To check that the reciprocal does not hold it is sufficient to take any two income
distributions r˜ = (r1 ≤ ... ≤ rn) and s˜ = (s1 ≤ ... ≤ sn) so that
∑n
i=1 ri =
∑n
i=1 si,
V L1 (x˜) = r˜, V
K
1 (y˜) = s˜, V
L
2 (x˜) = s˜, V
K
2 (y˜) = r˜ and s˜ LD by r˜. Then V2(x˜, y˜) = V1(x˜, y˜)
holds but neither
−→
ψ1(x, y) <
−→
ψ2(x, y) nor
−→
ψ1(x, y) >
−→
ψ2(x, y) do hold.
2. Part 2 can be proved analogously to Part 1.
We are now in a position to prove that the nine linear reforms proposed can be compared
in a specific way: they form a lattice9. However, before doing so we need to introduce some
definitions.
Let Γ(γ, ϕ, T ) be the set of nine linear dual tax reforms of a quasi-progressive dual tax
T (x, y) with aggregate labor tax liability γ and aggregate capital tax liability ϕ. We also
denote by ΓV (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜) (resp. ΓT (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜)) the set of nine curves LVi,j = LVi,j(x˜, y˜)
(resp. LTi,j = LTi,j(x˜, y˜)) where Ti,j(·, ·) ∈ Γ(γ, ϕ, T ) and x˜ and y˜ are respectively the labor
and capital pre-tax income distributions.
For any (γ, ϕ) ∈ R2+, given two reforms Ti,j(·, ·), Tk,l(·, ·) ∈ Γ(γ, ϕ), we define the following
operations ∨,∧ : Γ(γ, ϕ, T )× Γ(γ, ϕ, T )→ Γ(γ, ϕ, T ):
(11) Ti,j ∨ Tk,l = Ti⊕k,j⊕l, Ti,j ∧ Tk,l = Ti⊖k,j⊖l,
where the commutative operators ⊕,⊖ : {1, 2, 3}×{1, 2, 3} → {1, 2, 3} are defined by 1⊕
1 = 1, 1⊕2 = 2, 1⊕3 = 3, 2⊕2 = 2, 2⊕3 = 2, 3⊕3 = 3 and 1⊖1 = 1, 1⊖2 = 1, 1⊖3 = 1, 2⊖
2 = 2, 2⊖ 3 = 3, 3⊖ 3 = 3. We define as well ∨V ,∧V : ΓV (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜)× ΓV (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜)→
9A given set S is a partially ordered set (poset) if there is a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive binary
relation  that orders some pair of elements in S. We say a poset S is a lattice if any element in S has
supremum and infimum, i.e, there are operations ∨,∧ : S × S → S so that for any x, y ∈ S there is x ∨ y ∈ S
(resp. x ∧ y ∈ S) so that x, y  x ∨ y (resp. x, y  x ∧ y ) and for all z ∈ S\ (x ∨ y) (resp. z ∈ S\ (x ∧ y)) so
that x, y  z (resp. z  x, y), x ∨ y  z (resp. z  x ∨ y).
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ΓV (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜) and ∨T ,∧T : ΓT (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜)× ΓT (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜)→ ΓT (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜) by:
LVi,j ∨
V LVk,l = LVi⊕k,j⊕l, LVi,j ∧
V LVk,l = LVi⊖k,j⊖l(12)
LTi,j ∨
T LTk,l = LTi⊖k,j⊖l, LTi,j ∧
T LTk,l = LTi⊕k,j⊕l .(13)
Next we prove that linear dual tax cuts form a lattice.
Proposition 1 Let T (·, ·) be a quasi-progressive dual tax schedule, (γ, ϕ) ∈ R2+ and a (finite)
set of tax-payers with income distributions x˜ = (x1 ≤ ... ≤ xn) and y˜ = (y1 ≤ ... ≤ yn). Then
1. ΓV (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜) is a lattice endowed with the partial order  defined by the Lorenz Dom-
inance and the supremum and infimum operators ∨V ,∧V defined in (12). Moreover,
the Lorenz curve of x˜+ y = {xn + yn}n≥1 is LD by the infimum of the lattice.
2. ΓT (γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜) is a lattice endowed with the partial order  defined by the Lorenz
Dominance and the supremum and infimum operators ∨T ,∧Tdefined in (13). Moreover,
the supremum of the lattice is LD by the Lorenz curve of x˜+ y = {xn + yn}n≥1.
Proof.
1. Part 1 can be easily proved from Pfa¨hler (1984), Lemma 4 in the Appendix and Theorem
1.
2. Part 2 can be proved analogously to Part 1.
Corollary 1 Given (γ, ϕ) ∈ R2+, x˜ and y˜ labor and capital pre-tax income distributions
respectively and T (·, ·) a quasi-progressive dual tax schedule, Γ(γ, ϕ, T ) is a lattice endowed
with the partial order  defined by the Lorenz Dominance of the post-tax income distributions
and the supremum and infimum operators ∨,∧ defined in (11). Moreover, T2,2(·, ·) is the most
progressive reform and T1,1(·, ·) the least progressive.
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T11(x, y)
T12(x, y)
T13(x, y)
T21(x, y)
T22(x, y)
T23(x, y)
T31(x, y)
T32(x, y)
T33(x, y)
Figure 1: Lattice structure of the 9 linear dual tax reforms.
The lattice structure is shown in Figure 1. In a lattice it is only possible to compare
elements bearing a vertical relationship.
Finally, it is important to point out that the lattice structure referred to holds for any set
of nine linear tax cuts satisfying Condition 1, given any labor and capital income distributions
satisfying Condition 2. Moreover, if either Condition 1 or Condition 2 do not hold, we can find
quasi-progressive tax schedules and income distributions where the lattice structure does not
apply (see Example 1 in the Appendix). Hence, Condition 1 and Condition 2 are necessary
and sufficient conditions.
3.2 Local effects
We have so far focussed on the effect that linear dual tax reforms have on income distribution.
Let us now focus on the effect any of these reforms on a single tax-payer, according to Pfa¨hler
(1984).
Let ∆Vi,j(x, y) = ∆V
L
i (x) + ∆V
K
j (y) be the total post-tax income of a tax-payer with
respect to the Ti,j reform, where ∆V
L
i (x) and ∆V
K
j (y) are, respectively, the post-tax labor
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and capital incomes. A sufficient condition for Vi,j(x, y) ≥ Vk,l(x, y) is that V
L
i (x) ≥ V
L
k (x)
and V Kj (y) ≥ V
K
l (y). By Pfha¨ler (1984) and Theorem 1 we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 Let x˜ = (x1, ..., xn) and y˜ = (y1, ..., yn) be the labor and capital income
distributions of a (finite) set of tax-payers and let (xg, yg) = (l
−1(gL), k
−1(gK)), where
T (x, y) = L(x) +K(y) is the current quasi-progressive dual tax schedule. Then,
1. If (x, y) ≤ (xg, yg), the chosen tax reform by a tax-payer with incomes (x, y) is T2,2.
2. If (x, y) ≥ (xg, yg), the chosen tax reform by a tax-payer with incomes (x, y) is T1,1.
Notice that there is no restriction on the relative order on the capital and labor income
distributions. That is, unlike in Theorem 1, we only require Condition 1 and not Condition 2.
Also observe that a (finite) set of tax-payers can be divided into three subsets. Indeed, given
a tax-payer with a pair of incomes (x, y) we will say he or she is rich if (x, y) ≥ (xg, yg), poor if
(x, y) ≤ (xg, yg) and middle-class otherwise. Then, if poor tax-payers account for more than
half the population, the T2,2 reform would be chosen in an election to decide which reform
out of the nine proposed should be carried out, provided that all tax-payers voted rationally.
In such a case, these interests would be aligned with those of a Government concerned about
the redistribution of post-tax incomes.
4 Revenue elasticity
Progressivity and redistribution of taxes are relevant equity issues to be considered when
adopting tax reforms. Related to this analysis, there is also an empirical issue which is
important not only from an equity perspective but from a government one when preparing
a Budget, which is the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to income. With progressive
taxation, revenue is elastic with respect to a proportional growth of all incomes, and the
amount of this elasticity is also crucial for macroeconomic projections.
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Hutton and Lambert (1979) show that increasing the average rate progression β(x) of
a tax at every point of the income distribution raises the elasticity of the revenue function.
Considering this result, Pfa¨hler-based Ti,j tax cuts for dual taxes can also be partially ordered
by the responsiveness of the aggregate tax liability with respect to income. Indeed, let
Z =
∑n
i=1 (xi + yi) be the pre-tax aggregate total income and R =
∑n
i=1 (L(xi) +K(yi)) the
aggregate total tax liability. If Z changes only due to equiproportionate changes in x˜ and
y˜10, R can be viewed as function of Z.11 Suppose that, at some initial point, Z = Z0. Then,
R = R(kZ) with R(Z) = R0 = R(Z0).
The average-rate responsiveness and the elasticity of the aggregate total tax liability with
respect to the aggregate total income are defined respectively as
(14) A(Z) =
R′(Z)Z −R(Z)
Z2
=
(
R(Z)
Z
)′
,
(15) E(Z) =
R′(Z)Z
R(Z)
.
Next, we obtain the following result, that is proved in the appendix12.
Lemma 1 Let x˜ = (x1, ..., xn) and y˜ = (y1, ..., yn) be the labor and capital income distri-
butions respectively of a (finite) set of tax-payers and T (x, y) = L(x) +K(y) is the current
quasi-progressive dual tax schedule. Then,
A(Z) =
∑n
i=1
(
βL(xi) · x
2
i + β
K(yi) · y
2
i
)
Z2
,
E(Z) = 1 +
∑n
i=1
(
βL(xi) · x
2
i + β
K(yi) · y
2
i
)∑n
i=1 T (xi, yi)
.
Hence, we are in a position to extend Pfa¨hler’s result (1984).
Proposition 3 Let x˜ = (x1, ..., xn) and y˜ = (y1, ..., yn) be the labor and capital income
distributions respectively of a (finite) set of tax-payers. Let also T (·, ·) be a quasi-progressive
10r˜ = (r1, ..., rn) is obtained from a equiproportionate change of s˜ = (s1, ..., sn) if ri = ksi for all i = 1, ..., n.
11Hutton and Lambert (1979) make the same assumption.
12The proof, although similar to Hutton and Lambert (1979), is made for discrete distributions.
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dual tax schedule and (γ, ϕ) ∈ R2+. Then, Γ(γ, ϕ, T, x˜, y˜) is a lattice endowed with a partial
order  defined by the elasticity E(Z) of the aggregate total tax liability and the supremum
and infimum operators ∨,∧ are defined in (11).
Proof. According to Pfa¨hler (1984), β1(x) < β(x), β2(x) > β(x) and β3(x) = β(x), where
β(x), β1(x), β2(x) and β3(x) are the average rate progression of the unidimensional taxes
T (x), T1(x), T2(x) and T3(x), res-
pectively. Then, the proof is immediate from Lemma 1 and the definition of dual average
rate progression.
Again, notice that there is no restriction over the relative order on the capital and labor
income distributions. That is, Condition 2 is not needed. Moreover, Figure 1 also repre-
sents Proposition 3. Observe that, as in the unidimensional tax case, there is no trade-off
between the preferences of the Government concerning the aggregate total tax liability and
the redistribu-
tion of the post-tax income.
5 An empirical application: the case of the Spanish Income
dual Tax
This section describes an empirical application related to the dual income tax introduced
in Spain since 2007. By means of a static micro-simulation model SIMESP (Arcarons and
Calonge, 2008) and a very large data set of taxpayers drawn from 2004 Spanish Income Tax
Returns population we assess the redistributive and progressivity effects of linear tax reforms.
We consider two empirical applications.
First, yield-equivalent tax cuts applied on the dual income tax are compared. Specifically,
T1,1, T2,2 and T3,3 tax cuts defined in Section 2 are simulated to analyze their progressivity
and redistributive effects on income distribution. Elasticity coefficients of the simulated tax
functions are also estimated.
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In our second empirical exercise, the current dual tax applied since 2007 is compared to
the income tax which had been applied before that date. As we shall comment later on,
2007 dual tax reform introduced significant changes in the fiscal law. According to Spanish
Government budget forecasts, the impact of this reform was estimated as a 6% reduction
on aggregate tax revenue. Considering this, we analyze how much income redistribution the
dual tax introduced regarding the previous tax and, consequently, who the gainers and the
losers from this reform are, if any. To do so we apply a residual-progressive linear tax cut
on the previous tax to reach the same revenue of the dual tax reform. Then a differential
redistribution analysis is carried out by comparing the two tax burden distributions.
For both applications results are computed for the whole range of the income distribution
and locally for pre-tax income deciles. Before showing the results of these two applications
we shall briefly describe the main features of the Spanish Income Tax and the SIMESP
micro-simulation model we use.
5.1 Description of the current Spanish Income Tax (2007) Act ‘35/2006’
The most important feature of the current Spanish Personal Income Tax (PIT) is its dual
structure. On one hand, ‘labor’ income base includes salary, entrepreneur and professional
income, pension plan and rental income. This income base is rated according to a four-
bracket tax schedule, ranging from 24% to 43% as the highest marginal tax rate. On the
other hand, capital income and realized capital gains constitute what is called the ‘savings’
base -or ’capital’ income base- which is levied at 18% fixed rate, with a 1500 e deduction for
dividends.
Standard income deductions to be applied on general base are salary-related expenses,
social security contributions and the amount invested in pension plans. Furthermore, there
is a progressive allowance on earned income. In order to get taxable income, losses on earned
and capital incomes can only be offset within their own base. Other allowances are related
to the demography of the family: personal allowance for each tax payer (plus an addition
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allowance according to age), dependent children and ascendants. Further, these allowances
are augmented in the case of disabled members. Labor income-tax schedule is applied to the
total allowances, which deduces the gross-tax liability of PIT.
Main tax credits of PIT are related to housing: 15% tax credit on the interest mortgage
and capital (with a maximum of 9, 000 e). Other tax credits are applied to business activities.
From January 2008, 10.05% of the rent paid on the main home can be deducted, provided
that the taxable income is less than 24, 020e per year. Tax liabilities and tax credits are
shared by the central government and the regional-level administration at percentages of
67% and 33% respectively. Finally, although PIT has an individual nature, joint-returns are
also permitted by aggregating the incomes of each member in the family.
5.2 Data and the micro-simulation model
The empirical analysis is based on a very large data set of a million of tax payers containing
fiscal information from the 2004 Spanish Income Tax File-Return. The database is supplied
by the I.E.F. ‘Instituto de Estudios Fiscales’ to researchers. The sample contains almost 200
variables related to fiscal information of tax-payers and their relatives.
Stratitification of the sample (1176 stratas) has been carried out by province, income base
and the type of tax-return (individual and joint tax returns). Richest recipients have been
oversampled in order to get a better description of the highest part of income distribution.
Grossing-up factors are derived from the stratification scheme and they are used to estimate
population totals and other statistics from the sample (see Picos et al., 2007).
SIMESP is a static micro-simulation model for modeling reforms on PIT. As a static
model, it does not simulate behavior responses to changes in tax policies. Its output is
interpreted as short-term of first-round effect of the policy changes, but by using the large
data set mentioned before on administrative records, SIMESP takes advantage of the huge
heterogeneity regarding personal and demographic characteristics of the tax-payer popula-
tion. The model is able to providee some dynamic analysis projecting the monetary variable
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of the models. Computation of variables, tax and income distributions and statistical indices
are grossed-up by means of the sampling weights in order to obtain population aggregates.
To interpret the empirical section we should first point out the following issues. Our
theoretical predictions about the effect of linear dual tax cuts on income redistribution are
derived by using taxable income as the income variable of the analysis. Our simulations
are also based on the taxable-income variable, but their effects on income distribution are
measured as well considering the recipient pre-tax income. Pre-tax income is a more accurate
measure of the individual welfare than taxable income. The use of pre-tax income takes into
account the impact of allowances and deductions on PIT.
5.3 Comparing linear dual-tax cuts
In this exercise we compare three different linear tax cuts, T1,1, T2,2 and T3,3, according to
the neutral revenue hypothesis. Table 1 describes ‘labor’ and ‘capital’ tax schedules for the
current Spanish Income Tax –which is the baseline of the simulation – and the proposed
linear tax cuts after applying a 10% reduction on both labor and capital gross-tax liabilities.
Tax rates of simulated tax cuts are obtained according to equation (3). For both income
bases, we use parameters a, b, c instead of ρLi , σ
L
i , ρ
K
j , σ
K
j for simplicity. As explained in
Section 2, parameters a and g represent the tax cut as a percentage of the initial fiscal
revenue (10%) and average tax rates calculated as the ratio between gross-tax liabilities
and taxable income, respectively. Parameters c and b are obtained multiplying a by g and
g/(1 − g) respectively. The average tax rate on capital income gK is calculated before a
1, 500e allowance for dividends is applied.
The distribution impact of neutral-revenue tax cuts is measured either globally or locally
at a particular point of the income distribution. Table 2 summarizes the global effect of the
different tax cuts on total revenue, liability progression and income redistribution.
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Tax schedule
Baseline
Tax
T1,1 T2,2 T3,3
’Labor’ base
Tax Schedule
0-17, 360e 24% 21, 60% 21, 25% 21, 34%
17, 360− 32, 360e 28% 25, 20% 25, 40% 25, 34%
32, 360− 53, 360e 37% 33, 30% 34, 72% 34, 34%
> 53, 360e 43% 38, 70% 40, 94% 40, 34%
Parameter gL = 26.56% aL = 10% bL = 3.61% cL = 2.65%
’Savings’ base
Tax Schedule
18% 16, 20% 16, 29% 16, 27%
Parameter gK = 17.28% aK = 10% bK = 2.08% cK = 1.72%
Table 1. Baseline tax and simulated tax reforms.
Gross
Tax
Liability
(106e)
K S RE η η2 ∆R
Ref. 72765 0.136 0.148 0.033
T1,1 65489 0.136 0.148 0.029 1.454 1.066 952
T2,2 65509 0.142 0.157 0.031 1.470 1.078 963
T3,3 65495 0.140 0.154 0.030 1.466 1.074 960
Table 2. Main aggregate results13.
The first column of the Table 2 includes the initial revenue obtained by the microsimu-
13Parameter η represents the tax-elasticity coefficient obtained by simulating an 1% increase on the pre-tax
income components of each tax-payer. Taxable-income elasticity is estimated as 1.33643 * Simulated Gross
Tax Liability after 1% pre-tax income increased.
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lation model and the revenue figures simulated for the three tax cuts. Loss-revenue under
the three tax cuts accounts for approximately 10.50% of the gross-tax liability, instead of
the simulated 10% tax cut. The half point percent of discrepancy between these figures is
mainly due to the initial tax rate applied to the ‘saving base’, 17.27%, which is lower than
18%, the statutory tax rate (the capital average tax rate is computed before the dividend
allowance is applied). The proposed tax cuts are compared by using aggregate indices of lia-
bility progression and redistributive effect on income distribution. Tax-progressivity indices
as Kakwani (1976), K, and Suits (1977), S, are measures of liability progression. Values
of the progressivity indices for each tax cut reveal T2,2 as the most progressive one followed
by T3,3. Similar results can be inferred considering a measure of residual progression. The
redistributive effect of PIT on income distribution is measured by the Redistributive Effect
or Reynolds-Smolensky index, RE = Gx−Gx−T , where Gx and Gx−T are the Gini indices of
pre-tax and post-tax income respectively. Results reveals, again, that T2,2 increases income
redistribution the most, whereas T1,1 is the least redistributive tax cut.
Next, the differential distributional effects of linear tax cuts are also compa-
red in terms of Lorenz dominance by representing concentration curves of tax-payments
(or post-tax income) against the cumulated shares of pre-tax income recipients. To test
whether T2,2 is more liability progressive than T1,1 or T3,3 we only need to prove that the
concentration curves CT1,1 or CT3,3 dominate CT2,2, which implies that the distance between
curves is positive for each decile of the income distribution. In a similar way, T2,2 has a
greater redistribution on income with respect to T1,1 or T3,3 if the difference, LV2,2−LV1,1 or
LV3,3 − LV1,1, is always positive through income distribution, where LV1,1, LV2,2 and LV3,3
are the income post-tax distributions. The redistributive profile of PIT reforms T2,2 and T3,3
with respect to T1,1 is represented in Figure 2.
These results bear out the theoretical ones described in Section 3 indicating a clear Lorenz
dominance order T2,2 ≻ T3,3 ≻ T1,1 for residual progression. Similar results on liability
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Figure 2: Difference between post-tax taxable income Lorenz curves (continuous
curves refer to taxable income whereas dashed curves refer to pre-tax income).
progression, not reproduced here, are obtained for tax concentration curves.
The analysis of local differential effects on the income distribution can also be based on
the absolute increase of post-tax income that a particular tax-payer obtains from each reform.
To analyze how different taxes affect local inequality, the average gain is computed for a set
of income deciles. Figures 3 and 4 compare respectively T2,2 tax cuts against T1,1 and T3,3
tax cuts in terms of the percentage of gainers and the per capita amount of gaining for a set
of deciles of the pre-tax income distribution. T2,2 provides greater per capita gains till the
95% percentile of the income distribution.
What we observe from the distribution of gainers and losers in both figures is that the
T2,2 tax cut is favorable to the 90% tax payer population with less income. Furthermore, a
significant number of tax payers located between the 90% and 95% percentiles still remain
gainers under T2,2 tax cuts. This result indicates that the ‘break-even’ income (pre-tax
income value for which tax units would be indifferent to any of the proposed tax cuts) is
located in this income group. At the top of the income distribution, the situation would
be the reverse. Tax payers above ‘break-even’ income become losers for T2,2 (or gainers
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for T1,1 and T3,3). According to Pfa¨hler, the ‘break-even’ income defines a threshold which
determines tax payers’ voting preferences between tax cuts14. Results reveal that T2,2 would
be a preferred policy for the majority of tax payer population.
Finally, we focus on the elasticity of the tax functions corresponding to the reforms
proposed, according to the theoretical results obtained in Section 4. Let η measure the
elasticity of gross-tax liability with respect to income. This parameter has been computed
after comparing the fiscal revenues obtained from the corresponding tax T1,1, T2,2 and T3,3
before and after multiplying all pre-tax income sources by 1.01. The elasticity coefficients
obtained by micro-simulation are important in magnitude (1.46, 1.47). However, they do
not strictly reflect the elasticity due to the ‘shape’ of the tax function, the coefficient we
are interested in. Since taxable income is obtained from pre-tax income after application of
allowances and income-related deductions, we may expect substantial increase in elasticity
for taxable income if those fiscal credits are not upgraded in line with income. There is also
another effect which refers to those recipients with zero taxable income, which is upgraded
into liability as a consequence of the income increase.
We formulate the tax elasticity respect to pre-tax income as the product of the taxable-
income η1 and tax rate η2 elasticities, η = η1η2, where η1 depends basically on allowances and
deductions. Coefficient η1 is directly estimated by using the micro-simulation model and it
takes the same value for each tax cut, which is equal to 1.36. Elasticity coefficients associated
with the rate structure of each tax function are then computed from the ratio between η and
η1, which are shown in Table 2. Results reveals that T2,2 tax cut produces the most elastic
revenue source of the three types of progressivity-cuts, and obviously, T2,2 generates more
revenue than the other tax cuts. By contrast, T1,1 generates the lowest revenue of the three
taxes, confirming the hypothesis outlined in Section 3.
14To be consistent with the theoretical part, the ’break-even’ income should be defined for both income
bases. For simplicity, we only focus on the aggregate (unidimensional) ’break-even’, which approximates the
sum of the capital and labor break-even incomes.
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Figure 3: Comparing T2,2 against T1,1: percentage of gainers and losers (left) and
average gaining by income groups (right).
Figure 4: Comparing T2,2 against T3,3: percentage of gainers and losers (left) and
average gaining by income groups (right).
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The consequences for the distribution of tax burdens among tax units will be depend on
the tax elasticity at all values of observed pre-tax incomes. We compute ‘average’ elasticity
coefficients η and η2 for each income group (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). As we observe
from this table, the elasticity values of the tax schedule bear out the theoretical results, in
the sense that η2(T2,2) ≥ η2(T3,3) ≥ η2(T1,1).
Another empirical aspect to consider from the estimated elasticity coefficients is related
to the potential distortion originated by no-inflation adjustments. No indexation of the tax
affects all income groups, but their redistributional consequences could be different among
them. As an example, suppose we focus on the tax elasticity estimated for T2,2 tax cuts. We
can distinguish two different mechanisms. First, tax burden would be altered if allowances
and other deductions applied before obtaining taxable income not updated with inflation.
This fiscal drag is predominant for low income groups, where the tax function is quite flat,
according to values of η2 near to 1.01. Second, the ‘bracket creep’ effect through the tax
schedule essentially affects the highest income groups. See Immerwooll (2005) for a detailed
discussion on how a partial adjustment or simply, the absence of adjustment by inflation, can
affect the distributional properties of the income tax.
5.4 Effects of the Spanish dual tax reform
Spanish Income Tax (2007) Act ‘35/2006’ was announced as a tax reform by the government
in 2005 to be applied from the fiscal year 2007. Regarding the previous tax, a number of fiscal
changes introduced by the reform can be viewed as a simple updating of certain parameters
of the fiscal law (specifically, those related to minimum threshold, income limits, allowances
related to the labor income, private pension contributions, etc).15 Other changes in income
tax are structural elements related to the new tax design.
Next we focus on the elements which make the dual income-tax different with respect to
15For example, income allowance deducted from salaries was adjusted up to 13%, although this percentage
is still below the accumulate inflation generated since the previous revision.
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what it was before the reform. These features can be summarized as follows:
Tax schedule, marginal tax rates and demographic allowances.
As we see in Table 3, income brackets are wider in the dual tax. Basically, changes
introduced were 1) elimination of the first income bracket 2) updating the income limits
and 3) a lowering the highest marginal tax rate from 45% to 43%. Changes on the
income bracket limits are not exclusively an inflation update but they are also related
to the fact that allowances linked to the sociodemographic characteristics of the family
are applied after gross-tax liability is obtained. Specifically, this allowance is obtained
after applying the general tax schedule to the total amount of family deductions. The
main goal of the above changes is to introduce greater progressivity on the tax burden
distribution.
New taxation on capital income.
In the case of the dual tax, capital income is levied at an 18% fixed rate with a 1,500e
allowance for dividends. In contrast, capital income - including capital gains realized
within the year - before the reform was taxed according to the individual’s marginal
tax rate, t′ (except long term realized capital gains which were also taxed at 15% fixed
rate). This is indeed the most notable aspect of the reform. If we consider income from
interest, dividends, etc as a surplus added to the earned income in the case of most tax
payers, the new tax clearly favors those taxpayers with a previous marginal tax rate on
regular income higher than 18%. However, the previous tax allowed for 40% deduction
on taxable capital income for long-run savings, so an extra euro on this type of income
was marginally taxed at 0, 6t′. Furthermore, there was a 40% tax credit for dividends.
Other features.
Another important difference between the two taxes, in our opinion, is that the way
of compensating different types of incomes has been canceled out by the reform. Any
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negative yields on capital income were integrated into the income base before the reform,
whereas currently these should be offset exclusively on the capital income base belonging
to further fiscal years.
To compare both taxes under the equal-revenue hypothesis and focusing on the main
changes discussed above, some elements of the tax law before and after reform have been
restricted to be equal. The following parameters have been set as the same ones for both
taxes: realized capital gains taxed at 18% fixed rate, labor allowances calculated according
to the formula introduced by the reform and a 15% tax credit on housing investment (capital
and mortgage interest rates). Other limits related to private pension contribution are also
fixed to be the same ones. Once these changes had been introduced in the tax before reform,
the aggregate revenue and average tax rate were computed to simulate the tax schedule which
produced the same revenue as the dual tax.
Pre-reform tax schedule Dual tax schedule
(1) (2) (3)
0-4,000e 15% 12.50% 0-17360e 24%
4,000-13,800e 25% 21.75% 17360-32360e 28%
13,800-25,800e 30% 25.85% 32,360-52,360e 37%
25,800-45,000e 37% 35.15% >52360e 43%
>45.000e 45% 43.35%
Capital gains 15% 18% Savings base 18%
Table 3. Tax rates structure of simulated taxes
In this exercise we focus on comparing taxes (2) and (3), that are the previous tax schedule
that produces the same revenue than the dual tax and the dual tax itself, respectively. Tax
burden comparisons are based on net tax liabilities, since, in both taxes, tax credit are
approximately equal in both taxes. In the context of this two yield-equivalent tax comparison,
we can say that differences, if any, in post-tax income distribution between the pre-tax
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and post-tax reform are mainly related to the three points outlined above. Obviously, the
distribution of gainers and losers we should expect from this analysis is also related to those
fiscal changes.
As a first result of this simulation, we stress that the reform produces a large number of
losers: a 45.60% tax payers pay more than they would have to pay before reform, against
a 35% percentage of gainers. Approximately 25% of the recipients are indifferent between
both reforms. Tax payers who benefit or (do not) from the tax reform are not uniformly
distributed throughout the income scale. The tax reform clearly benefits the two lowest
income groups. There are scarcely not losers at the bottom of the income distribution.
Percentages of 6.69% and 28% of tax payers from the first and second income deciles benefit
from the tax reform. Percentages of losers are significant for the remaining income deciles.
Regarding the population located between the 40% and 98% percentiles, losers percentages
are higher than gainers ones (see Table 4).
Income deciles 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 98% 100%
% Gainers 6.69 28.51 42.31 28.01 32.35 31.08 27.81 24.00 18.97 24.35 30.26 55.64
Per capita gains (e) 157 151 168 201 220 248 332 405 513 740 977 4, 214
% Losers 0.00 0.53 8.95 45.17 51.84 59.54 67.20 76.64 80.58 75.60 69.53 44.27
Per capita losses (e) 1.127 104 64 103 125 148 184 265 375 416 584 818
Table 4. Distribution of share and cumulated shares of pre-tax income,
taxable-income and gross-tax liability T by income deciles.
The distribution of losers comes mainly from the dual tax schedule designed. The change
of sociodemographic deductions from the ’income base system’ to ’tax credits’ system favors
low-income tax-payers. The rest of the population experiments an increase in the marginal
tax rate as a consequence of that change.
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6 Conclusions
The distributive effects of a class of linear tax cuts (or tax increases) are established by Pfa´hler
(1984). His main results show that yield-equivalent tax cuts can be ranked according to a
social welfare criterion (Lorenz dominance). His analysis identifies the most redistributive
policy as the one which the initial residual progression of the tax. However when dual taxes
are concerned (where two tax functions are applied to different income bases), Pfa¨hler’s
results need further development.
In this paper we define a bi-dimensional progression measure which is needed to establish
the Lorenz dominance criterion among post-tax income distribution. To do this, the dual tax
cuts must be simultaneously labor and capital yield-equivalent. Moreover, the relative order
of both labor and capital income distribution must coincide. We set up a lattice whereby
Pfa¨hler-type linear tax refoms are compared.
Finally, by means of a microsimulation model and a large dataset of income tax payers we
empirically illustrate the effect of linear tax cuts on dual taxes. Our analysis is carried out to
focus on redistribution and progressivity effects as well as the elasticity of the tax functions.
7 Appendix
7.1 Theoretical part
Remark 1
Consider a unidimensional tax schedule defined by
T (x) =
m+1∑
i=0
Ti(x)
where 0 < t1 < ... < tm < tm+1 < 1 are the marginal types, 0 = x0 < x1 < ... < xm <
xm+1 =∞ are the marginal incomes and
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Ti(x) = max {0,min{xi − xi−1, x− xi−1}} · ti
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ 1. We say that T (x) is a stepwise tax schedule.
It can be easily checked that T (x) is progressive and convex. Further, given a linear tax
reform t′(x) = d · t(x) + h defined on the average type t(x) = T (x)/x we next prove that the
new tax schedule is stepwise where 0 < d · t1 + h < ... < d · tm + h < d · tm+1 + h < 1 are the
marginal types and 0 = x0 < x1 < ... < xm < xm+1 =∞ are the marginal incomes.
As t(x) =
(∑m+1
i=0 Ti(x)
)
\x we have
t′(x) = d · t(x) + h
=
m+1∑
i=0
d · Ti(x) + h · x
x
=
m+1∑
i=0
d ·
Ti(x)︷ ︸︸ ︷
max {0,min{xi − xi−1, x− xi−1}} ·ti
x
+
h ·
x︷ ︸︸ ︷
m+1∑
i=0
max {0,min{xi − xi−1, x− xi−1}}
x
=
m+1∑
i=0
max {0,min{xi − xi−1, x− xi−1}} ·
t
′
i︷ ︸︸ ︷
(dti + h)
x
.
Lemma 2 (Pfa¨hler) Let T (x) a unidimensional tax schedule and Ti(x), i = 1, 2, 3 the Pfa¨hler-
based linear cuts with the same aggregate total tax liability. Then α(x) = α1(x) < α3(x) <
α2(x) and ψ(x) = ψ2(x) < ψ3(x) < ψ1(x).
Proposition 4 (Jakobsson) Let T1(x) and T2(x)be two dual tax schedules. For any pre-tax
income distribution x˜ = (x1, ..., xn) of a (finite) set of tax-payers,
1. T˜1(x) = (T1(x1), ..., T1(xn)) is LD by T˜2(x) = (T2(x1), ..., T2(xn)) if and only if α1(x) >
α2(x) for all x ≥ 0.
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2. V˜1(x) = (x1 − T1(x1), ..., xn − T1(xn))is LD by V˜2(x) = (x1 − T2(x1), ..., xn − T2(xn)) if
and only if ψ1(x) > ψ2(x) for all x ≥ 0.
It is important to point out that Jakobsson’s proof (1976) assumes implicitly that a
more restrictive constraint than α2(x0) < α2(x0), for all x0, holds. In fact, he assumes that
α2(x0, x1) < α2(x0, x1) for all x0 < x1, given an income distribution x˜ = {x0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ ...}.
However, when x0 ≈ x1 both conditions almost coincide. Indeed, α(x0, x1) =
T (x1)−T (x0)
x1−x0
·
x0
T (x0)
= T ′(x0) ·
x0
T (x0)
+ o(x1 − x0). Therefore, if a income distribution x˜ is dense, i.e. any
xi is close enough to xi+1 then Jakobsson assumptions are correct. Finally notice that this
final assumption would not hold for the highest tail of the income distribution. However, in
such cases the tax schedule is almost proportional and both measures coincide.
Lemma 3 (Pfa¨hler) Given a unidimensional tax schedule T (x) and given the three Pfa¨hler-
based unidimensional tax cuts
x S t−1(g) = xg ⇒ V2(x) T V3(x) T V1(x)
and
x S t−1(g) = xg ⇒
dV2(x)
dx
T dV3(x)
dx
T dV1(x)
dx
where Vi(x) is the post-tax income of a tax-payer with pre-tax income x when reform i is
applied to T (x) for all i = 1, 2, 3.16
Pfa¨hler (1984) shows that the magnitude t−1(g) = xg -break-even pre-tax income- is
important for two reasons:
• Consider the proportional tax schedule proportional Tp(x) = gx. Then,
T (x) ≥ Tp(x) = gx⇔
T (x)
x
≥ g ⇔ t(x) ≥ g ⇔ x ≥ xg
16We rewrite and extend what Pfa¨hler (1984) says in his paper.
33
• xg is the same for the three reforms as it only depends on g =
T
x
.
Lemma 4 Let x˜1 = (x11 ≤ ... ≤ x
1
n), x˜
2 = (x21 ≤ ... ≤ x
2
n), y˜
1 = (y1
1
≤ ... ≤ y1n) and
y˜2 = (y21 ≤ ... ≤ y
2
n) be income distributions such that x˜
2 is LD by x˜1 and y˜2 is LD by y˜1. If∑n
i=1 x
1
i =
∑n
i=1 x
2
i and
∑n
i=1 y
1
i =
∑n
i=1 y
2
i then x˜
2 + y2 is LD by x˜1 + y1.
Proof. The Lorenz curve of x˜1 + y1 = (x11 + y
1
1 ≤ ... ≤ x
1
n + y
1
n) is defined by
Lx1+y1(p) =
∑p
i=1
(
x1i + y
1
i
)∑n
i=1
(
x1i + y
1
i
)
for p = 1, ..., n. Analogously, the Lorenz curve of x˜2 + y2 = (x21 + y
2
1 ≤ ... ≤ x
2
n + y
2
n) is
defined by
Lx2+y2(p) =
∑p
i=1
(
x2i + y
2
i
)∑n
i=1
(
x2i + y
2
i
)
for p = 1, ..., n. Then, from hypothesis, for p 6= 0, n,
Lx1+y1(p) > Lx2+y2(p)⇔
p∑
t=1
(
x1i + y
1
i
)
>
p∑
t=1
(
x2i + y
2
i
)
.
Finally, given 0 < p < n,
p∑
t=1
(
x1i + y
1
i
)
=
p∑
t=1
x1i +
p∑
t=1
y1i >
p∑
t=1
x2i +
p∑
t=1
y2i =
p∑
t=1
(
x2i + y
2
i
)
for x˜2 is LD by x˜1, y˜2 is LD by y˜1 and the hypothesis of the lemma.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 1] We have
(16) R(kZ) =
n∑
i=1
L(kxi) +K(kyi).
If we take the derivative of (16) with respect to k and evaluate it in k = 1 we obtain
R′(Z)Z =
n∑
i=1
L′(xi)xi +K
′(yi)yi.
On the other hand, from (7),
Z2A(Z) +R(Z) =
n∑
i=1
L′(xi)xi +K
′(yi)yi ⇔
Z2A(Z) =
n∑
i=1
(
L′(xi)xi +K
′(yi)yi
)
−
n∑
i=1
(L(xi) +K(yi))⇔
Z2A(Z) =
n∑
i=1
(
L′(xi)xi − L(xi)
x2i
x2i +
K ′(yi)yi −K(yi)
y2i
y2i
)
.
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Example 1
Consider the quasi-progressive dual tax schedule T (x, y) = L(x) +K(y)where L(x) and
K(y) are unidimensional tax schedules, on the labor income and on the capital income re-
spectively, that are applied to the following income distribution z = {(2, 1), (3, 4), (6, 5)} in
the way defined in the table below:
x y x+ y T(x,y) t(x,y) L(x) l(x) K(y) k(y)
2 1 3 1.05 0.35 0.80 0.40 0.25 0.25
3 4 7 3.25 0.46 1.25 0.42 2.00 0.50
6 5 11 5.60 0.51 2.60 0.43 3.00 0.60
Table A.1. Income distributions and quasi-progressive dual tax schedule.
Consider also the following two reforms: T1,3(x, y) = T (x, y) − 0.1 · L(x) − 0.24 · y and
T3,2(x, y) = T (x, y) − 0.232 · x − 0.6585 · (y − K(y)), which applied to the above tax and
income distributions result in the table below:
x y L1,3(x) K1,3(y) T1,3(x,y) L3,2(x) K3,2(y) T3,2(x,y)
2 1 0.72 0.01 0.73 0.34 0.20 0.54
3 4 1.13 1.04 2.17 0.55 1.87 2.42
6 5 2.34 1.80 4.14 1.21 2.87 4.08
Table A.2. Dual tax cuts.
Observe that the two reforms proposed are not separately labor and capital yield-equivalent,
although they are globally yield-equivalent -the aggregate total tax liability is approximately
equal to 7.04-. That is, Condition 1 does not hold.
On the other hand, if we take into account the discrete definition of the residual progres-
sion it can be obtained17 that, given an income distribution z = (z1 ≤ ... ≤ zn), and two
17 V1(zi+1)−V1(zi)
V1(zi)
· zi
zi+1−zi
>
V2(zi+1)−V2(zi)
V2(zi)
· zi
zi+1−zi
⇔
V1(zi+1)−V1(zi)
V1(zi)
>
V2(zi+1)−V2(zi)
V2(zi)
⇔
V1(zi+1)
V1(zi)
− 1 >
V2(zi+1)
V2(zi)
− 1⇔
V1(zi+1)
V1(zi)
>
V2(zi+1)
V2(zi)
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reforms T1(z) y T2(z), if ψT1(zi, zi+1) > ψT2(zi, zi+1) for some zi, i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, then
(17)
V1(zi+1)
V1(zi)
>
V2(zi+1)
V2(zi)
.
Hence, it can be checked that, by (17),
V L1,3(3,4)
V L1,3(2,1)
<
V l3,2(3,4)
V L3,2(2,1)
,
V K1,3(3,4)
V K1,3(2,1)
>
V K3,2(3,4)
V K3,2(2,1)
,
V1,3(3,4)
V1,3(2,1)
>
V3,2(3,4)
V3,2(2,1)
,
V L1,3(6,5)
V L1,3(3,4)
<
V L3,2(6,5)
V L3,2(3,4)
,
V K1,3(6,5)
V K1,3(3,4)
>
V K3,2(6,5)
V K3,2(3,4)
,
V1,3(6,5)
V1,3(3,4)
<
V3,2(6,5)
V3,2(3,4)
,
and that VT1,3(x˜, y˜) = (2.27; 4.84; 6.86) and VT3,2(x˜, y˜) = (2.46; 4.58; 6.92) are not LD-comparable,
although labor and capital tax schedules are separately comparable by ψ(x) and ψ(y), and
also using the Lorenz Domination criterium. Although income distribution of this example is
not dense, we obtain exactly what Jakobbson (1976) predicts (see Calonge and Tejada, 2009,
for a further argument on how density of can affect Jakobsson results).
In conclusion, if Condition 1 does not hold, dual tax cuts T1,3 and T3,2 cannot be compared,
neither by ψ(x+y) nor
−→
ψ (x,y) nor using the Lorenz Domination criterium on the total post-
tax income distribution, as it is the case when such condition does hold. Therefore, Condition
1 is necessary. Similar examples show that Condition 2 also necessary.
7.2 Empirical part
deciles 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95% 98% 100%
T1,1 η 2.945 2.483 2.507 2.149 1.568 1.374 1.324 1.359 1.304 1.437 1.452 1.236
η2 1.040 1.009 1.005 1.004 1.001 1.006 1.007 1.094 1.108 1.246 1.288 1.158
T2,2 η 2.937 2.482 2.507 2.149 1.568 1.374 1.326 1.378 1.324 1.480 1.495 1.255
η2 1.038 1.008 1.005 1.004 1.001 1.005 1.008 1.109 1.125 1.283 1.327 1.175
T3,3 η 2.939 2.482 2.507 2.149 1.568 1.374 1.325 1.373 1.319 1.469 1.484 1.250
η2 1.038 1.008 1.005 1.004 1.001 1.006 1.008 1.105 1.120 1.273 1.316 1.171
η1 2.831 2.461 2.495 2.141 1.566 1.366 1.315 1.242 1.177 1.154 1.127 1.068
Table A.3. Losers and gainers analysis: elasticities.
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